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Animals and Implicit Inferences in 
Bramdom’s Work
ABSTRACT
Brandom denies animals implicit reasoning by emphasizing their in-
ability to make inferences explicit, and in so doing, denigrates animals 
by likening their behavior to that of machines and artifacts. With dis-
turbing regularity and ease, Brandom equates pigeons and parrots to 
machines and thermostats in their inability to express implicit/explicit 
inferences: neither the pigeon nor the machine can “provid[e] reasons 
for making other moves in the language game.” I contest, however, 
that animals are paradigmatically more than any similarity or analogy 
to mechanical processing, just as humans are paradigmatically more 
than any reductive analogy to animals. The human/animal distinction 
need not come at the cost of ignoring the difference between animals 
and artifacts, and I believe we can largely subscribe to Brandom’s dif-
ferentiation of the human in terms of expressionism if we allow that 
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As distinguished from the extantness of material things 
and from the existence of humans, we call the mode of 
being of plants and animals: life 
—Heidegger 1997, 14
Introduction
Robert Brandom refers to humans as concept-using animals, 
distinct from other animals in their discursive practices, name-
ly in their ability to articulate inferences, and he convincingly 
shows how concepts are commitments that are articulatable 
within a web of reasons. This web links implicit and explicit 
inferences, and, Brandom claims, is inherently linguistic. If we 
grant Brandom’s definition of linguistic discourse as unique to 
human cognition (thus precluding discussion of putative non-
human language and discourse, let alone infants and severely 
impaired humans who cannot articulate reasons), we still run 
into a problem concerning nonhuman, higher-order animals 
(hereafter “animals”), for Brandom lumps animal cognition 
with mechanical computation throughout his major opus, Mak-
ing It Explicit (1994), and its abbreviated form, Articulating 
Reasons (2000). He often speaks of parrots as a kind of thermo-
stat reacting reliably to stimuli and nothing more. The problem 
has two dimensions: counterintuitive conclusions and their cor-
responding (im)moral implications. 
There seems to be an obvious categorical difference between 
animals such as parrots and artifacts such as thermostats, so 
Brandom’s insistent grouping of the two together fails to cor-
respond to our (or at least my) intuitions of reality. Brandom 
usually associates animals and artifacts when he is emphasiz-
ing how human perception exceeds mere stimuli—we see red 
in a web of inferences, such as blood, wine, stop, rage, etc. 
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Insofar as Brandom is exaggerating the mechanical aspect of 
animals in order to more clearly contrast them with the discur-
sive aspect of humans, we can grant him rhetorical license. The 
ease and frequency of this reductive gesture, however, suggests 
otherwise.
Brandom’s philosophical categorization of humans leaves 
little doubt that he actually views animals as biological ma-
chines. What would be nondiscursive (pre-linguistic) infer-
ences in humans are analogous in animals to the nondiscursive 
deductions of computers. That is, Brandom draws a sharp line 
between humans and nonhumans: only humans make infer-
ences. If animals are no more than machines, we have no more 
moral duty towards animals than we do towards machines.
Brandom admits that his project “risks being beastly to the 
beasts” because it focuses on “the fanciest sort of intention-
ally”—ours—“that involves expressive capacities that cannot 
be made sense of apart from participation in linguistic prac-
tices” (1994, 7). He claims that his project depends on “the 
lower grades of intentionality,” presumably of animals, inas-
much as he hopes to show how “linguistic abilities arise out 
of nonlinguistic ones” (7). That this pseudo-apology follows 
a discussion of “Descartes’ seminal demarcational story” (6) 
should clue the reader into the fact that Brandom in truth views 
animals and artifacts in the same light—both without inten-
tionality except in the basest form, such as iron rusting (33-34; 
cf. Okrent 2007, 81). The mechanistic logic that denies mental 
content with language in animals, as found in Descartes, runs 
throughout Brandom’s work.
The implications of this Cartesian gesture go against our 
moral intuitions that recognize some responsibility towards 
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animals based on their cognitive faculties, emotions, ability to 
feel pain, etc.; but even if this moral intuition, however deeply 
rooted, is nothing more than an argument from analogy, as Pe-
ter Harrison claims (1991), there is still the problem of categor-
ically treating animals as machines, at least in the Heideggarian 
sense of enframing (1993). That is, the intuition that harming 
an animal is categorically different than “harming” an artifact 
goes beyond mere analogies between humans and animals—
we humans evidently recognize that the difference between a 
live animal and a dead animal is not the same as the difference 
between a functioning machine and a defunct machine. I con-
tend that we categorically view living things as having inherent 
value apart from any imputed value we may attribute to animals 
and artifacts alike.
To deny this moral obligation humans have towards living 
things is to label any sentiments towards animals as no different 
from those we may have towards artifacts (a wedding ring, for 
example). That is, such sentiments could be dismissed in pur-
suit of, say, science: live vivisections of animals would be like 
tinkering with a running machine. This, as in Descartes’ day, 
goes against our moral intuitions about life and about responsi-
bility towards living things.
If we believe there is something that makes animals and ar-
tifacts ultimately incommensurable, namely life, can we make 
sense of the distinction of living/non-living in light of Bran-
dom’s human/nonhuman distinction? That is, would modifying 
Brandom’s initial distinction between humans and nonhumans 
create room for the distinction between animals and artifacts? 
Or, keeping Brandom’s initial distinction, what further distinc-
tions need to be made to separate animals from artifacts?
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We need to briefly go over how Brandom’s theory of infer-
entialism works before we can hope to locate or create a space 
within the theory for animals. We also need to show how ani-
mals differ from non-animals in order to group them with hu-
mans in opposition to mere things. 
Differentiating Humans from Animals 
Both Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons are about 
the “use and content of concepts” especially as regards “the 
nature of language [in] . . . us rational, indeed logical, concept-
mongering creatures” (and since the latter is the shorter, con-
densed version of the two, most of my references are to Articu-
lating Reasons) (Brandom 1994, 1; 2000, xi). Moreover, in the 
Introduction to Articulating Reasons, Brandom lays his cards 
on the table, showing where he stands on nine philosophical 
issues that bear on his inferentialism. The Introduction makes 
clear his disingenuous position on animal minds, and by look-
ing at the first five methodological stances, I hope to pinpoint 
where his theory could be altered so as to create a space for 
animals as distinct from artifacts. 
His first foundational philosophical position, siding with 
“differentiation” over “assimilation” (prioritizing “disconti-
nuities between discursive and nondiscursive creatures”) bears 
most directly on the topic at hand (Brandom 2000, 2). Brandom 
is not just showing his differential approach towards “crea-
tures”; already—on page 2—he is showing his indifference to-
wards nonhuman animals by assimilating them with artifacts: 
“the judgments and actions of concept users, on the one hand, 
and the uptake of environmental information and instrumental 
interventions of non-concept-using organisms and artifacts, on 
the other” (3, my emphasis). The crux of this assimilation of 
animals and artifacts is that Brandom opposes them both as 
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non-concept-using to humans, who are, by definition, concept-
using.
The implicit reason for rejecting conceptual ability in ani-
mals lies in Brandom’s second stance as a pragmatic function-
alist, rather than a “platonist.” The “platonist,” here, is one who 
explains the “use of concepts in terms of a prior understanding 
of conceptual content”; Brandom, however, “seeks to explain 
how the use of linguistic expressions, or the functional role of 
intentional states, confers conceptual content on them” (4, my 
emphasis). The platonist would consider what conceptual con-
tent might or must be and then locate it, presumably by degree, 
in higher- and lower-order animals. For Brandom, however, 
our unique ability to make “explicit propositions or principles 
form the direction of what is implicit in practices” indicates, 
or rather consists in, our unique capacity to have, through par-
ticipation, (linguistic) conceptions of reality, and defines us as 
sapient creatures (4). According to Brandom, one’s conception 
of reality (as concepts) is an all or nothing game.
Animals and artifacts don’t have conceptions of the world, 
according to Brandom, because they do not have language as 
such, they only have “a primitive kind of practical taking of 
something as something” (1994, 33-34). For Brandom, neither 
the mind nor language is the locus of intentionality—his third 
philosophical position. “Concepts are applied in the realm of 
language by the public use of sentences and other linguistic 
expressions,” says Brandom, “[and] are applied in the realm 
of mind by the private adoption of and rational reliance on be-
liefs and other intentional states” (2000, 5). Since animals don’t 
have a public language, and “concept use is not intelligible in 
a context that does not include language use,” then they can’t 
have beliefs and intentional states (6). Even “[o]ur mammalian 
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cousins, primate ancestors, and neonatal offspring,” though 
“sentient and purposive but not discursive creatures,” don’t 
have concepts and intentional states (1994, 276). We may inter-
pret them derivatively as having intentionality, but they do not. 
If our infants and evolutionary forefathers can’t make implicit 
inferences, then certainly there’s no room for animal intention-
ality. 
The denial of intentional states with external language in 
animals corresponds with Brandom’s fourth preference for 
expression over representation as the genus of concepts. The 
project of “representation,” contra Brandom’s project, assumes 
that “simpler forms of [representation] are exhibited already in 
the activity of non-concept-using creatures, and on that basis 
elaborate ever more complex forms until one reaches some-
thing recognizable as specifically conceptual representation” 
(7). For Brandom, however, expressions (“making explicit 
what is implicit”) and concepts are necessarily related (8-9). 
The assumption, again, is that only humans can do this unique 
thing, namely “turning something we can initially only do into 
something we can say: codifying some sort of knowing how 
in the form of knowing that” (8). (“Initially” seems to apply 
to pre-linguistic humans, i.e. infants, not evolutionarily pre-
human animals, e.g. orangutans.)
The fifth stance, viewing the conceptual as inferential, not 
intentional, is a major fulcrum of Brandom’s theory and, per-
haps equally so, of my criticism. (Accordingly, this is the last 
of the nine stances I will discuss, the other four being less per-
tinent.) He says, “[W]hat distinguishes specifically discursive 
practices from the doings of non-concept-using creatures is 
their inferential articulation. To talk about concepts is to talk 
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about roles in reasoning” (10-11). The key to Brandom’s infer-
entialism is that :
It understands expressing something, making it explic-
it, as putting it in a form in which it can serve as and 
stand in need of reasons: a form in which it can serve 
as both premise and conclusion in inferences. Saying 
or thinking that things are thus-and-so is undertaking 
a distinctive kind of inferentially articulated commit-
ment (11).
Brandom’s inferentialism, therefore, encapsulates his “consti-
tutive, pragmatist, relationally linguistic, conceptual expressiv-
ism” that differentiates humans from animals and artifacts (9).
My criticism is that Brandom unjustly ignores the differ-
ence between animals and artifacts by ignoring the minimum 
(though profound) similarity between humans and animals as 
living creatures. He fails by his own account: 
Of course, wherever the story starts [assimilation or 
differentiation of the conceptual], it will need to ac-
count both for the ways in which concept use is like 
the comportments of non-discursive creatures and the 
ways in which it differs. Theories that assimilate con-
ceptually structured activity to the nonconceptual ac-
tivity out of which it arises... are in danger of failing to 
make enough of the difference. Theories that adopt the 
converse strategy [differentiation]... court the danger 
of not doing justice to generic similarities (3). 
Brandom simply does not do justice to the generic similarities 
of humans and animals, thereby trivializing what distinguishes 
animals from mere things. 
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Differentiating Animals from Artifacts
In a rare and all too brief section of Articulating Reasons, 
Brandom distinguishes animals from artifacts:
Sentience is what we share with nonverbal animals 
such as cats—the capacity to be aware in the sense 
of being awake. Sentience, which so far as our under-
standing yet reaches is an exclusively biological phe-
nomenon, is in turn to be distinguished from the mere 
reliable differential responsiveness we sentients share 
with artifacts such as thermostats and land mines. Sa-
pience, by contrast, concerns understanding or intel-
ligence other than irritability or arousal (2000, 157).
According to Brandom, the pigeon and the thermostat are alike 
in their ability to reliably respond to stimuli, only pigeons do 
this biologically and thermostats mechanically. I’m afraid that 
would be Descartes’ position as well.
But even if animals have no mind similar to humans (no 
sapience), the reduction of animals to mechanical operations 
implies the difference between animals and artifacts: what is 
amazing about a dog performing a trick is that it is perform-
ing a trick, that it is trained; the specialness of dog training as 
opposed to computer programming is made apparent when the 
dog gets confused and messes up. Machines don’t get nervous 
or distracted by crowds of people; they don’t suddenly become 
more interested in an observer’s hat or shoe than in their mas-
ter’s voice or treat. That is, the ability to mechanize animals 
(imperfectly) only reveals the fact that they are not machines.
Consider this typical, inhumane comparison of a thermome-
ter and a parrot: “The difference between a tape-triggering ther-
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mometer or a parrot trained to utter ‘It’s getting warmer’ when 
exposed to suitable changes of temperature and the human ob-
server’s... lies... in the understanding of the classificatory sig-
nificance attributed to those responses,” i.e., lies in the human’s 
understanding of the meaning of “it’s getting warmer” and the 
thermometer/animal’s lack of understanding (1985, 32). 
Now let us conceive of the situation differently and see how 
Brandom’s conclusions fare. Let’s keep the thermometer and 
the human observer from off the street, but instead of a par-
rot let’s use a foreigner who can’t speak the native tongue, but 
whom we taught to successfully announce when “it’s getting 
warmer” without teaching her what the words mean. 
That “the [American] observer does and the instrument does 
not grasp or attribute such a signification to its own response” 
(32-33) still is true in the adapted situation, but what about with 
the foreign observer? Are we to assume that even though she 
doesn’t have the linguistic analogues to “it’s getting warmer,” 
she wouldn’t (or couldn’t) grasp the implicit meaning of her 
response to stimuli, namely that it’s getting warmer? 
I think it is fair to assume that, given human intellect, hu-
mans can understand implicit meanings even without any abil-
ity to make explicit (in the English language, for example) 
what they understand implicitly. That is, the foreigner would 
understand that it is getting warmer, and that getting warmer 
corresponds to the sounds “ts gttng wôrmr”; she would be able 
to understand the semantic correspondence to the stimulus no 
matter whether she were trained to say “es wird wärmer” or 
“plank slab block.” We know this because, as Brandom points 
out, humans can understand inferences theoretically. If we grant 
that animals can’t understand theoretical inferences, on what 
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grounds besides presumption does Brandom assert that animals 
have no more implicit understanding of practical inferences 
than artifacts such as thermometers do? Mark Okrent is able 
to give a compelling account of animal rationality grounded in 
teleology while still maintaining a unique kind of linguistic ra-
tionality in humans (grounded in their self-determining teleol-
ogy) (Okrent, 2007). That is, even if Brandom is right to assert 
that humans alone can perform theoretical inferences, Okrent 
shows again and again how animals perform what can only be 
called practical inferences. 
Okrent works off Donald Griffin’s description (1984, 88-90) 
of the plover bird’s “broken wing display,” a creatively vari-
able defense mechanism used by other bird species as well, and 
perhaps also by fish (Ruxton, Sherratt, and Speed 2004). The 
plover feigns injury to distract predators away from the bird’s 
nest, but not in a programmatic way; rather, the bird behaves in 
a richly versatile way, adapting to the changing situation, tak-
ing into consideration, so to speak, variable environmental fac-
tors and actions of the predator, what Michael Wheeler might 
call flexible, adaptive richness (2005). Of note to Okrent is that 
the bird isn’t merely responding to given stimuli according to 
biological programming (if you will) or innate goals, as lower-
order animals do. The Sphex wasp, for instance, displays a kind 
of rationality that adapts to changes in its environment, but it 
adapts in a predictable, systematic way when an experimenter 
moves the food for its eggs, a caterpillar, as the wasp checks the 
burrow before adding the caterpillar (Okrent, 2007, 7; working 
off a description by Wooldridge 1963, 82). Okrent comments, 
What the plover does is more versatile and adaptive 
than what the wasp does in a wider range of circum-
stances. The plover can deal with the presence of ex-
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perimental intervention [of a scientist or a predator] far 
more effectively than the wasp can, for example. And 
the plover is far more capable of adjusting her behav-
ior in light of what seems to be a recognition of the 
failure of a previous behavior to achieve its proximate 
end than is the wasp. You won’t find a plover endlessly 
repeating a failed subroutine in the way that the wasp 
in the example does. For those reasons, among others, 
we say that the plover’s behavior is more rational (8).
By more rational, Okrent means that lower-order animals only 
have an instrumental rationality (teleology), whereas higher-or-
der animals act according to goals that are determined by their 
rational beliefs and desires (though they lack mental awareness 
of intentionality). Okrent’s contention that higher-order animals 
act on (non-conscious) intentionality is a stronger claim than 
I am making, that animals make practical inferences.  Okrent 
shows that animals act according to the general principles of 
their teleology (innate goals), and in ways that are “flexible, 
versatile, and appropriate in novel ways” (intentionality) (166), 
and this intentional teleology fits—if not exceeds—Brandom’s 
description of the “intrinsically motivating preferences or de-
sires” of practical inferences and rational action (2000, 31), 
thus showing that practical inferences are prior to, or at least 
separable from, theoretical inferences. 
Therefore, to return to the thermometer parrot story, the par-
rot is more like a foreigner than a thermometer in saying that 
it’s getting warmer, for they are both recognizing and acting 
upon a desired goal, a practical inference, as opposed to the 
thermometer which simply responds to “merely external fac-
tors,” as Okrent would put it (2007, 81). Though neither the 
parrot nor the foreigner understands the semantics of the Eng-
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lish language, they both recognize the inference that when it 
gets warmer, they say “it’s getting warmer,” whereas the ther-
mometer can’t make practical inferences. Thus, rather than 
showing animals as reducible to biological machines, Bran-
dom’s example actually highlights the similarities of humans 
and animals as distinct from artifacts.
Synthesizing Animal Implicit and  
Human Explicit Understanding
Although Brandom’s anti-animal rhetoric in Making It Ex-
plicit and Articulating Reasons pervades his very system of 
inferentialism, the task of creating a space in his theory for ani-
mals to make implicit inferences may be easier than it seems. 
In fact, an earlier work of his gives us a rubric for incorporating 
animal inferences into his schema. 
Brandom’s 1985 “Varieties of Understanding” delves into 
familiar categories of understanding, “that which remains im-
plicit in practice, and that which becomes explicit in principles” 
(27). Of course, Brandom is interested in “the sophisticated 
kind of understanding which is explicitly instituted, codified, 
and communicated in the form of explications” (which are ulti-
mately founded upon implicit practice), but he rather candidly 
(for him) affirms implicit inferences apart from (not merely pri-
or to) explicit understanding, albeit somewhat condescending-
ly: “Students of animal learning are concerned with the simple 
kind of understanding which is implicit in the skilled practice 
of prelinguistic performers whose behavior must be treated as 
regular rather than rule governed” (27). In contrast with his re-
cent work which emphasizes a differentialist approach to ratio-
nality, here Brandom the “pragmatist emphasizes the continuity 
of human understanding with animal understanding... by con-
trast to the platonist’s emphasis on the discontinuities marked 
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by animals’ incapacity to act according to explicit principles” 
(28). Let us discuss his pragmatist approach here before recon-
ciling it with his later, more platonic approach.
The first move of the pragmatist “is to try to explain under-
standing that something is the case... in terms of understanding 
how to do something, and further to understand understanding... 
simply as being able to do something, to perform appropriately 
according to some practice” (28). Implicit inferences involve 
doing the appropriate things appropriately—a cat waiting for a 
mouse, a man shooing a fly. While this is prelinguistic, I don’t 
see why it mustn’t include rationality, broadly construed, per-
haps even what we call phronesis. We needn’t attribute beliefs 
and desires, as Mark Okrent does, to quasi-rational animals to 
admit some form of rationality to animals (Okrent, 2007). Sim-
ply put, higher-order animals seem to display flexible and adap-
tive goal-directed behavior, what I want to call phronesis, much 
like we do—but this does not obviate the extreme gap between 
such shared phronesis and the uniquely human rationality of 
self-reflection, anxiety, soul, conscience, Dasein, or, as Bran-
dom would have it, the explanatory understanding involved in 
making inferences explicit.
Brandom continues: “to describe the form of such an ac-
count [of explicit understanding],” however, “is not to offer 
an account of explicit understanding” (1985, 28). Even if we 
can give an account of a broken-wing display performing bird 
in terms of beliefs and desires (as Okrent does), our descrip-
tion does not imply such explicit understanding in the bird (as 
Okrent rightly points out) (2007, 2). That is, even if the bird is 
reasoning (adapting to unique situations with unique goals), it 
is, for all we know, not reasoning in a reflective way (“If I do 
such and such maybe—I hope!—such and such will happen”); 
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rather, it is reasoning only on the implicit level (as we do when 
we judge whether to scoot our seat forward or back when sit-
ting). When we hail a taxi, it involves some kind of thought or 
desire (a taxi) and requisite action (signaling), but this thought 
and action isn’t reflective (“I find myself wanting a taxi”); just 
so with animals—actions, rationality, desires, or what have 
you, are reflexive, but not self-reflexive.
What distinguishes humans is the ability to make explicit 
such implicit desires, reasons, etc.—“inferences,” according 
to Brandom—in an explanatory gesture. Animals, however, 
can’t explain to themselves or to us how something is, only that 
something is. This “expliciting,” according to Brandom, goes 
hand in hand with “impliciting”; but if animals can’t “explicit,” 
how do they “implicit” inferences? The later Brandom seems 
unable to leave room in his philosophy for animals to be able 
to make implicit inferences, and so lumps the animals with the 
artifacts. Nonetheless, I contend that we can redeem Brandom’s 
later two-sides-of-the-coin approach to inferences by appealing 
to his earlier account of understanding, and so rescue animals 
from the ghetto of Cartesian objects. 
We can allow for animals to have implicit inferences but not 
the ability to make such inferences explicit, without rejecting 
the two-sided coin account of inferences, if we allow humans 
to make explicit animal inferences on their behalf. In order to 
“turn [implicit inferences] into an [explicit] account one must 
at least be prepared to offer a pragmatist story about how to 
build explicit understanding as codified in principles out of 
forms of understanding which are merely implicit, manifest-
ing themselves only in appropriate practice and not in such 
principles” (Brandom 1985, 28). Such an explication, however, 
cannot be mere description, as noted above. For example, such 
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an explication cannot merely appeal to evolutionary biology or 
behaviorism. We need a story that goes beyond mere descrip-
tion or ascription. 
Conclusion
For now, I hope to have shown how animals can be under-
stood apart from artifacts without undermining Brandom’s dif-
ferentialism, showing how Brandom could reincorporate im-
plicit animal inferences into his thought. Addressing what it 
might look like for humans to perform explication on behalf of 
implicit animal inferences, however, remains for a later project. 
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